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The Unvarnished Truth: 
The Debate on the Law of the Sea Convention 
William L. Schachte Jr. -
Good afternoon. Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, friends. Profes-sor Mandsager, thank you for that kind introduction. It 's nice to be intro-
duced by someone you truly respect. It is an honor to be your speaker today. I am 
grateful for your gracious hospitality. 
Background 
The Senate's consideration of US accession to the 1982 United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea (1982 LOS Convention)l this year, as it did when the 
Senate last considered the Convention in 2004, has produced an amazing array of 
opposition arguments. Well, this is America and protecting our rights, such as free-
dom of speech-which of course includes the right to speak out on or participate in 
debates on major issues-is why many Americans have chosen to be members of 
our armed forces. However, when examined, the opposition arguments are basi-
cally intellectually bankrupt. Reminds me of the fellow down South who used to la-
ment, "Broke? Man I'm so broke I can 't even pay attention." 
In fact, I couldn' t resist the opportunity to express my true feelings at a forum 
sponsored by the Brookings Institution in September 2004. After Senator Lugar's 
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opening remarks, we five panelists were given five to seven minutes each and then 
the floor was open for questions. Frank Gaffney asked for and was given the oppor-
tunity to speak first. I followed. I took the full five minutes and these were my 
opening comm ents: 
There has been a constant drumbeat of ill-founded cntlclSm predicting near-
apocalyptic doom for the United States if it accedes to the Law of the Sea Convention. 
The opponents constantly argue that the Law of the Sea (LOS) Convention will cripple 
the U.S. Navy's ability to perform maritime missions necessary for national security, 
including collecting intelligence, conducting submerged transits with submarines, and 
preventing actions by terrorists. I am compelled to speak out against these misguided 
and incorrect beliefs to set the record straight. I certainly respe<:t honest, deliberate 
scrutiny of this complex Convention. But, given the repeated misstatements of fact, it is 
hard not to conclude that there are some who are engaged in a deliberate, concerted 
effort to mislead the public and our government leaders on this important issue for our 
nation. It is bad enough to be wrong, but there is something more serious going on 
when people ignore facts and are consciously and purposefully wrong. Bottom line: 
nothing in the LOS Convention hampers, impedes, trumps or otherwise interferes 
with traditional naval activities we currently conduct or will conduct in the future. I 
sincerely want to thank the Brookings Institute [sicl for providing this opportunity to 
communicate the truth about the LOS Convention.1 
You will recall that the Convention 's opponents were successful in preventing a 
floor vote during the second session of the One Hundred Eighth Congress. It was 
almost unprecedented to have a treaty unanimously reported out of committee, 
yet fail to go to the full Senate for a vote. 
As the One Hundred Tenth Senate considers the 1982 LOS Convention, a num-
ber of items have appeared in the press and online asserting the Convention is con-
trary to US interests.3 The opponents' arguments have been aggressively countered 
by the Convention's supporters.~ 
On October 3 1, 2007, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted seventeen 
to four in favor of acceding to the treaty. S Its report has been sent to the full Senate 
for consideration. 
The strongest supporters of the 1982 LOS Convention are those directly affected 
by itf' The arguments made by Convention opponents and the Bush administra-
tion's rebuttals from the One Hundred Eighth Senate's consideration of the Con-
vention appear in the written statem ents of Department of State Legal Adviser 
William H. Taft before the Senate Committee on Armed Services on April 8, 2004,' 
before the House Committee on International Relations on May 12, 2004,8 and be-
fore the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on June 8, 2004;9 and in testi-
mony by Assistant Secretary of State lohn Turner before the Senate Committee of 
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Foreign Relations on October 21, 2003,10 and before the Senate Committee on En-
vironment and Public Wodcs on March 23, 2004. II This year, testimony in support 
of the Convention was provided to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by 
Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon 
England and Admiral Patrick Walsh, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, on Septem-
ber 27, 2007.12 The Chairman of the loint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, 
stated unequivocally that the Convention advances US interests during his confir-
mation hearings before the Senate Committee on Armed Services on July 31, 
2007.13 
Opposition Myths 
The following is a sampling of the myths regarding the Convention that opponents 
continue to trumpet. 
President Reagan thought the treaty was irremediably defective.14 
This is absolutely false . President Reagan expressed concerns only about Part Xl 's 
deep seabed mining regime. IS In fact, he believed that Part Xl could be fixed and 
specifically identified the elements in need of revision. 16 In response to those con-
cerns, the regime has been fixed in a legally binding manner that addresses each of 
the US objections to the earlier regime. I? The rest of the treaty was considered so fa-
vorable to US interests that, in his 1983 Ocean Policy Statement, President Reagan 
ordered the government to abide by and exercise the rights accorded by the non-
deep-seabed provisions of the Convention.ls 
US adherence to the Convention is not necessary because navigational 
freedoms are not threatened (and the only guarantee of free passage on the 
seas is the power of the US Navy).19 
Wrong! It is not true that our navigational freedoms are not threatened. There are 
more than one hundred illegal, excessive claims affecting vital navigational and 
overflight rights and freedoms. The United States has utilized diplomatic and oper-
ational challenges to resist the excessive maritime claims of other nations that in-
terfere with US navigational rights as reflected in the Convention. But these 
operations entail a certain amount of risk, e.g., the Black Sea bumping incident 
with the former Soviet Union in 1988. Being a party to the Convention would sig-
nificantly enhance our efforts to roll back these claims by, among other things, 
putting the United States in a far stronger position to assert our rights and afford-
ing us additional methods of resolving conflict. 
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The Convention was drafted before-and without regard to-the war on 
terror and what the United States must do to wage it successfully.20 
An irrelevant canard. It is true that the Convention was drafted befo re the war on 
terror; however, the Convention enhances, rather than undermines, our ability to 
successfully wage the war on terror. The maximum maritime naval and air mobil-
ity that is assured by the Convention is essential for our military forces to operate 
effectively. The Convention provides the necessary stabili ty and framework for our 
forces, weapons and materie1 to get to the fight without hindrance--and ensures 
that our forces will not be hindered in the future. Accordingly, the Convention 
supports our war on terrorism by providing important stabili ty for navigational 
freedoms and overflight. It preserves the right of the US military to use the world's 
oceans to meet national security requirements. It is essential that key sea and air 
lanes remain open as an international legal right and not be contingent upon ap-
proval from nations along the routes. A stable legal regime for the world's oceans 
will support global mobili ty for our armed forces. 
Obligatory technology transfers will equip actual or potential adversaries 
with sensitive and militarily useful equipment and know-how such as anti-
submarine warfare technology.21 
Total bunk. No technology transfers are required by the Convention. Mandatory 
technology transfers were eliminated by Section 5 of the Annex to the Agreement 
amending Part Xl of the Convention. Further, Article 302 of the Convention ex-
plicitly provides that nothing in the Convention requires a party to disclose infor-
mation the disclosure of which is contrary to the essential interests of its security. 
As a non-party, the United States is allowed to search any ship that enters our 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) to detenninewhether it could hann the United 
States or pollute the marine environment. Under the Convention, the US 
Coast Guard or others would not be able to search any ship until the United 
Nations is notified and approves the right to search the shipP 
Absurdly false. Under applicable treaty law-the 1958 law of the sea conventions-
as well as customary international law, no nation has the right to arbitrarily search 
any ship that enters its EEZ to determine whether it could harm that nation or pol-
lute its marine environment. Nor would we want countries to have such a blanket 
"right," because it would fundamentally undermine the freedom of navigation that 
benefits the United States more than any other nation. Thus, the description of 
both the status quo and the Convention's provisions is incorrect. The Convention 
makes no change in our existing ability or authority to search ships entering our 
EEZ with regard to security or protection of the environment. One final and very 
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important point: under the Convention, the UN has absolutely no role in US mili-
tary operations, such as in deciding when and where a foreign ship may be boarded. 
Other parties will reject the US "military activities" declaration as a reservation. n 
A ridiculously false assertion. The US dedamtion is consistent with the Conven-
tion and is not a reservation. It is an option explicitly provided by Article 298 of the 
Convention. Other parties to the Convention that have already made such declara-
tions exercising this option include the United Kingdom, Russia, France, Canada, 
Mexico, Argentina, Portugal, Denmark, Ukraine, Norway and China. 
The 1994 Agreement doesn't even pretend to amend the Convention; it merely 
establishes controlling interpretive provisions.24 
Nonsense. The Convention could only have been fonnally "amended" jfit had already 
entered into force. The 1994 Agreement25 was negotiated as a separate agreement 
in order to ensure that the Convention did not enter into force with Part XI in its 
flawed state. The 1994 Agreement made explicit, legally binding changes to the 
Convention and has the same legal effect as if it were an amendment to the Con-
vention itself. 26 
A letter signed by all living former Legal Advisers to the US Department of State, 
representing both Republican and Democrat administrations, confirms the legally 
binding nature of the changes to the Convention effected by the 1994 Agreement. 
Their letter states, "[T[he Reagan Administration's objection to the LOS Conven-
tion, as expressed in 1982 and 1983, was limited to the deep seabed mining regime. 
The 1994 Implementing Agreement that revised this regime, in our opinion, satis-
factorily resolved that objection and has binding legal effect in its modification of 
the LOS Convention."27 
The problems identified by President Reagan in 1983 were not remedied by 
the 1994 Agreement relating to deep seabed mining.28 
Wrong. Each objection has been addressed. Among other things, the 1994 
Agreement 
• Provides for access by US industry to deep seabed minerals on the basis of 
non-discriminatory and reasonable terms and conditions;29 
• Overhauls the decision-making rules to accord the United States critical 
influence, including veto power over the most important future decisions that 
would affect US interests and, in other cases, requires two-thirds majorities that will 
enable us to protect our interests by putting together small blocking minorities;30 
,nd 
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• Restructures the regime to comport with free-market principles, including 
the elimination of the earlier mandatory technology transfer provisions and all 
production controls.ll 
The Convention gives the United Nations its first opportunity to levy taxes.32 
A ludicrously false assertion. The Convention does not provide for or authorize 
taxation of individuals or corporations. It does include revenue sharing provisions 
for oiVgas activities on the continental shelf beyond 200 miles33 and administrative 
fees for deep seabed mining operations.14 The costs are less than the royalties paid 
to foreign countries for drilling off their coasts and none of the revenues go to the 
United Nations. These minimal costs are worth it according to reliable industry 
representatives. (US companies applying for deep seabed mining licenses would 
pay the application fee directly to the Seabed Authority; no implementing legisla-
tion would be necessary.) US consent would be required for any expenditure of 
such revenues. With respect to deep seabed mining, because the United States is a 
non-party to the 1982 LOS Convention, US companies currently lack the ability to 
engage in such mining under US authority. Becoming a party will give our firms 
such ability and will open up new revenue opportunities for them when deep sea-
bed mining becomes economically viable. The alternative is no deep seabed min-
ing for US fi rms, except through other nations that are parties to the Convention. 
The Convention mandates another tribunal to adjudicate disputes}S 
The asserted authority of the tribunal is wildly inaccurate. The Convention estab-
lished the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. However, parties are free 
to choose other methods of dispute settlement. The United States would choose 
two forms of arbitration rather than the Tribunal. 
The United States would be subject to the Seabed Disputes Chamber if deep sea-
bed mining ever takes place. The proposed Resolution of Advice and Consent 
makes clear that the Seabed Disputes Chamber's decisions "shall be enforceable in 
the territory of the United States only in accordance with procedures established by 
implementing legislation and that such procedures shall be subject to such legal 
and factual review as is constitutionally required and without precedential effect in 
any court of the United States."36 The Chamber's authority extends only to dis-
putes involving the mining of minerals from the deep seabed; no other activities, 
including operations in the water column or on the surface of the oceans, are sub-
ject to it. 
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us adherence will entail history's biggest voluntary transfer of wealth and 
surrender of sovereignty)] 
To the contrary, the Convention enhances not only sovereignty of military ships 
and aircraft, but also bolsters our resource jurisdiction over a vast area off the 
coasts of the United States. Furthermore, under the Convention, as superseded by 
the 1994 Agreement, there is absolutely no transfer of wealth and no surrender of 
sovereignty. In fact, the Convention supports the sovereignty and sovereign rights 
of the United States over extensive maritime territory and natural resources off its 
coast, including a broad continental shelf that in many areas extends well beyond 
the 200 nautical mile limit, and would give us additional capacity to defend those 
claims against others. The mandatory technology transfer provisions of the origi-
nal Convention, an element ofthe Convention that the United States objected to, 
were eliminated in the 1994 Agreement. 
The International Seabed Authority (ISA) has the power to regulate seven-
tenths of the earth's surface, impose international taxes, etc. :>a 
Nothing could be further from the truth. The Convention addresses seven-tenths 
of the earth's surface; however, the ISA does not. The authority ofthe ISA is strictly 
limited to administering mining of minerals in areas of the deep seabed beyond na-
tional jurisdiction, generally more than 200 miles from the shore of any nation. At 
present, and in the foreseeable future, such deep seabed mining is economically 
unfeasible. The ISA has no other role and has no general regulatory authority over 
the uses of the oceans, including freedom of navigation and overflight. The ISA has 
no authority or abili ty to levy taxes. 
The United States might end up without a vote in the ISA)9 
Not possible. The Council is the main decision-making body of the ISA. The 
United States would have a permanent seat on the Council, by virtue of its being 
the State with the largest economy in terms of gross domestic product on the date 
of entry into force of the Convention, November 16, 1994.40 This would give us a 
uniquely influential role on the Council, the body that matters most. 
The People's Republic of China asserts that the Convention entitles it to 
exclusive economic control of the waters within a 200 nautical mile radius of 
its artificial islands-including waters transited by the vast majority of 
Japanese and American oil tankers en route to and from the Persian Gulf.41 
Wrong again on both facts and law. The US government is not aware of any claims 
by China to a 200 mile economic zone around its artificial islands. Any claim that 
artificial islands generate a territorial sea or EEZ would be illegal under the 
135 
The Unvarnished Truth: The Debate on the lAw of the Sea Convention 
Convention. The Convention specifically provides that artificial islands do not 
have the status of islands and have no territorial sea or EEZ of their own.42 
Participation in the Law of the Sea Convention would render the Proliferation 
Security Initiative (PSI) invalid.41 
Wrong and an inswt to our military leadership, all of whom strongly support the 
Convention. US accession to the Convention wowd in no way hinder our efforts 
under the PSI to interdict vessels suspected of engaging in the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction. The PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles re-
quires participating countries to act consistently with national legal authorities and 
" relevant international law and frameworks," which includes the law reflected in 
the 1982 LOS Convention. 
Concluding Remarks 
Those are the basic arguments. Before going to my predictions, I would like to 
stress one point; whether a party or non -party, a robust Freedom of Navigation 
Program must be an essential part of US oceans policy. This treaty, or any treaty, is 
only effective if it is implemented by action. 
Predictions: I'm going to be an optimist here. Considering the favorable vote of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the direct support "in writing" from the 
President, the support of the Democratic side of the aisle, as well as support from 
Senators Lugar, Stevens, Warner and others, I predict the Convention will get to 
the floor and receive the necessary votes for advice and consent. The United States 
will finally join the current 155 parties to the Convention. 
Having said that, and after obselVing the Senate maneuvering over the Immi-
gration Bill that is now pending, something "unforeseen" from the far right might 
still be possible. But I'm relying on the wisdom of Winston Churchill and his state-
ment: "You can always count on the Americans to do the right thing. Yes, you can 
always count on the Americans to do the right thing-after they've exhausted every 
o ther possibility.» 
Thank you very much again. 
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